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Wild, Wild West
By Rick Leventhal
May 8, 2006
The Al Anbar province in western Iraq is a vast, sparsely populated area that stretches from the Euphrates River Valley to the Syrian border. Agriculture is the number one economy, and water is the most important resource. It's 30,000 square miles of desert, dotted by farmland, with numerous small cities and towns, some of them 3000 years old.
"Wide open spaces to tight confined places," is how Colonel Blake Crowe describes it. There are good people in Al Anbar, but there's also a thriving criminal element.
"This is the wild, wild west out here,” he told me. Crowe is Regimental Commander of the 7th Marines out of 29 Palms, California. He's a rugged full bird colonel with a hard charging demeanor and serious commitment to the task at hand.
He gave me and my crew a no-nonsense briefing when we arrived at Camp Ripper, a base within a base at the Al Asad airfield.
Al Anbar is Sunni territory. There's no sectarian violence, but a serious threat from local insurgents and outside terrorists, who often work with Al Qaeda to coordinate attacks against coalition forces.
"There's 50 to 60% unemployment in the Euphrates River area," the colonel told me, contributing to a "huge" criminal element. The illiteracy rate is high. It's traditionally been a "forgotten" part of the country, so the people here don't pay much attention to what happens in Baghdad or Ramadi. They're suspicious of outsiders and get their news by word of mouth, so rumors run rampant. And there's a long-time smuggling network that's helping to sneak foreign fighters across the border and into safe houses where they can organize and plan strikes against convoys and bases.
The Marines know the smuggler's preferred routes, and there are operations underway to shut them down.
Like much of Iraq, Al Anbar has a strong tribal system led by sheiks that have great sway over their people. They're the real "power players," often telling the local politicians what to do. What the Sheik says goes, so the coalition has been working with them, trying to increase cooperation, especially in regard to outing bad guys hiding in their midst, and convincing young men to sign up for the Iraqi army.
"These guys are fiercely independent and don't want anyone telling them what to do." However, the colonel says, "If someone does something dishonorable, they deal with that person.” He recognizes there is no way to work around the tribes. The only way to succeed is to work with them.
As for the threats, Crowe says most insurgents know better than to engage our troops. They're outgunned, outclassed, and incapable of winning a firefight, so they plant roadside bombs instead.
There is a lesser threat from car bombs, but the threat does exist. The drivers are typically very young, usually 15- or 16-years-old, often from Saudi Arabia. Very few homicide bombers are Iraqis.
The colonel says his team measures success in different ways. They face difficult challenges in improving the quality of life and training the Iraqi security forces, but see progress. There's more and better local governance. They're working on improving economic security (one example: helping a bank open in the town of Haditha) and strengthening the power grid. People are building homes, with air conditioning and satellite dishes. And they're starting to talk to the Iraqi soldiers who are taking the lead in more missions.
When I last saw the colonel, he was hosting a barbecue for some high-ranking Marines and Iraqi army officers, including an Iraqi general. They were gathered under camouflage netting behind the HQ building, eating steaks and drinking soda or near beer, followed by tea and cigars.
They swapped stories and jokes. They spoke in English and Arabic. Sometimes translators were necessary, sometimes not. Bonds are forming. The camraderie is there, and the confidence among both groups appears strong.
By Rick Leventhal
May 8, 2006
The Al Anbar province in western Iraq is a vast, sparsely populated area that stretches from the Euphrates River Valley to the Syrian border. Agriculture is the number one economy, and water is the most important resource. It's 30,000 square miles of desert, dotted by farmland, with numerous small cities and towns, some of them 3000 years old.
"Wide open spaces to tight confined places," is how Colonel Blake Crowe describes it. There are good people in Al Anbar, but there's also a thriving criminal element.
"This is the wild, wild west out here,” he told me. Crowe is Regimental Commander of the 7th Marines out of 29 Palms, California. He's a rugged full bird colonel with a hard charging demeanor and serious commitment to the task at hand.
He gave me and my crew a no-nonsense briefing when we arrived at Camp Ripper, a base within a base at the Al Asad airfield.
Al Anbar is Sunni territory. There's no sectarian violence, but a serious threat from local insurgents and outside terrorists, who often work with Al Qaeda to coordinate attacks against coalition forces.
"There's 50 to 60% unemployment in the Euphrates River area," the colonel told me, contributing to a "huge" criminal element. The illiteracy rate is high. It's traditionally been a "forgotten" part of the country, so the people here don't pay much attention to what happens in Baghdad or Ramadi. They're suspicious of outsiders and get their news by word of mouth, so rumors run rampant. And there's a long-time smuggling network that's helping to sneak foreign fighters across the border and into safe houses where they can organize and plan strikes against convoys and bases.
The Marines know the smuggler's preferred routes, and there are operations underway to shut them down.
Like much of Iraq, Al Anbar has a strong tribal system led by sheiks that have great sway over their people. They're the real "power players," often telling the local politicians what to do. What the Sheik says goes, so the coalition has been working with them, trying to increase cooperation, especially in regard to outing bad guys hiding in their midst, and convincing young men to sign up for the Iraqi army.
"These guys are fiercely independent and don't want anyone telling them what to do." However, the colonel says, "If someone does something dishonorable, they deal with that person.” He recognizes there is no way to work around the tribes. The only way to succeed is to work with them.
As for the threats, Crowe says most insurgents know better than to engage our troops. They're outgunned, outclassed, and incapable of winning a firefight, so they plant roadside bombs instead.
There is a lesser threat from car bombs, but the threat does exist. The drivers are typically very young, usually 15- or 16-years-old, often from Saudi Arabia. Very few homicide bombers are Iraqis.
The colonel says his team measures success in different ways. They face difficult challenges in improving the quality of life and training the Iraqi security forces, but see progress. There's more and better local governance. They're working on improving economic security (one example: helping a bank open in the town of Haditha) and strengthening the power grid. People are building homes, with air conditioning and satellite dishes. And they're starting to talk to the Iraqi soldiers who are taking the lead in more missions.
When I last saw the colonel, he was hosting a barbecue for some high-ranking Marines and Iraqi army officers, including an Iraqi general. They were gathered under camouflage netting behind the HQ building, eating steaks and drinking soda or near beer, followed by tea and cigars.
They swapped stories and jokes. They spoke in English and Arabic. Sometimes translators were necessary, sometimes not. Bonds are forming. The camraderie is there, and the confidence among both groups appears strong.
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